Syiria’s Nuclear Weapon
Syria’s Nuclear Weapon: What to Do
The “news” that North Korea and Syria were cooperating in the development of nuclear weapons, a “charge” the Bush administration made yesterday, is not news to anyone who has been closely following the September incident in which Israel mysteriously attacked a remote facility in Syria. It may not even be true.
I say may not be true because it is important to understand that the intelligence — both American and Israeli — is limited and even elliptical, and though I don’t doubt that the two countries cooperate on weapons of mass destruction — Hezbollah’s main long-range missile used against Israel in the 2006 war was a Syrian/North Korean hybrid — getting the goods regarding clandestine nuclear developments, and then proving that the intent is to develop nuclear weapons, is incredibly difficult.
In fact, the whole question of nuclear weapons is so prone to hyperbole that if the actual intent is to dissuade nations from developing nuclear weapons, the best road is transparency and accountability — not bombing, exaggeration and mystery.
On Sept. 6, Israel mounted a secret raid on a facility deep inside Syria, a bombing attack that the country has still barely even acknowledged and one that Israeli and U.S. officials, until yesterday, have been practically silent about.
Anyone who has been following the story knows of the North Korean connection. Syria of course has denied everything; North Korea has denounced the preemptive strike. Iran has protested. Et cetera.
Because of the exaggeration and intelligence failures relating to Iraq, these countries almost get away with their denials. Yes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (which administers the non-proliferation regime) and the United Nations oppose the illegal development of nuclear weapons. But because of the intelligence failures in the past — and because of the exaggeration that accompanies the atom — the goal of non-proliferation is undermined and a lot of people are confused about the truth.
The question regarding Syria, North Korea, Iran and (at least retrospectively) Iraq is this: What to do?
Yesterday the Bush administration made the claim that Syria was “within weeks or months” of completion of a nuclear reactor — which of course is not nuclear weapon. Part of the problem here is the exaggeration that goes into describing (and understanding) a nuclear weapons program. Even if Syria managed to complete a plutonium production reactor, and then managed to operate it for the months would be needed to manufacture the materials it needed, and then managed to machine that plutonium, and then design and fabricate a nuclear weapon, many months if not years would go by. Such a program would be detected, proven and probably thwarted by the international community.
In other words, to bomb a single unfinished possible reactor last September was a panicked and flawed response. It did not further the ultimate goal of non-proliferation. In the war of persuasion, in the international battle to improve the rule of law, the actual goal is undermined, for the “illegality” of Syria developing nuclear weapons in the first place is based upon law, actual or societally accepted. Turning to preemption and just taking the law into one’s own hands achieves nothing.
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A note on yesterday’s blog: Many thought my labeling of Gen. David Petraeus as “King David” was some kind of personal religious/crusader comment. This is not a nickname I made up but one Iraqis conferred upon the general during his first assignment to Iraq in 2003 as commander of the 101st Airborne Division.
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